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When does a new individual human life begin? Thinking about
this question, and the integration of philosophy and science required to
resolve it, led me to read Nonnan Ford's book, When Did I Begin?

Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and
Science. 1 Nestled within Ford's book is a remarkable series of scientific
statements so potentially fruitfu l in answering the question of the origin
of human life that I feel compelled to share my reading of them. We
must follow Ford's insight and prepare a place of understanding by also
considering the philosophical and hi storical dimensions of the question
and its answers.
Science tells us that the materials for a new being are present as
the sperm enters the outer membranes of the ovum and that the new
complex of chromosomes exists twenty to twenty-four hours later at
syngamy. This concludes fertilization and marks the beginning of the
zygote.2 There is then cell cleavage under the instruction of the
mother's messenger RNA. This mRNA was within the ovum prior to
fertilization. Recent research also tells us that the DNA in one of the
daughter cells "switches on" when the zygote is between the two to four
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cell stage.) from this moment forward to death the individual has
internal self-directed development into an embryo, fetus, newborn baby.
child, adult, and elderly person. Aristotle's definition of nature as an
internal principle of activity and rest 4 leads to the conclusion that this
moment of DNA activation is the likely beginning moment of a new
human being.
In monozygotic twins, two cells "tum on" with subsequent
parallel but separate development. The material DNA template is the
same but the individuals are unique. Twinning remains a challenge to
the presence of the human soul from the first moments of life because
it can occur up to seven days after fertilization. This challenge is
reduced but not eliminated with the scientific information that there is
short term externally controlled development prior to the enlivening of
the individua1's's own DNA.

Human Nature and the Soul
Aristotle and his great medieval commentator, Thomas
Aquinas, teach that each natural thing, living or non-living, is a
substantial unity between matter and fonn. S Within the living, thi s
substantial form that is so tightly knit to the body is the soul. The
Greeks had a broad conception of soul as the principle oflife. 6 But in
the present day, when we say "soul", we usually mean: human soul.
The human soul is different from the souls of other living beings
because of its immateriality. William A. Wallace has devoted much
scholarship to understanding nature and natural being within Thomistic
tradition. 7 Of the human, he writes, "For the Thomist, man is a
substantial unity resulting from a union between matter and spirit that
is the most intimate possible. Man has a soul, which is spiritual...it
intrinsically informs the body, vitalizes it, renders it capable of
performing all of its psychic and psycho-somatic functions. ,, 8
According to Aristotle, nature can be said to be either matter or
form but it is more properly said of form because it is form that
determines matter to be of a particular kind. Thus, in the Physics
nature is defined as "an internal source or cause of being moved and of
being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and
not in virtue of a concomitant attribute." OJ Following this line of
thought, human nature wou ld include both matter and form , body and
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soul; but, it is more properly the soul. As substantial Conn the soul is
the detenninate principle of human existence. ' (} Thus it is the internal
energizing rational principle enlivening each human being.
The human soul is immaterial and, as such, it cannot be
generated by parents and transmitted to offspring. Thomas Aquinas
follows Aristotle in requiring a divine origin for the rational soul
because of the immateriality of human thought. However, Aquinas
adds that a human soul is created ex nihilo and infused by God fo r each
human individual. II
The question we are concerned with is when does this occur?
When does a human being begin? Currently, there is little di spute that
there is human biological life by the end of fertilization, often called the
moment of conception. ' 2
Fertilization results in a conceptus, also called the zygote. This
is the single cell that results from the intertwining of chromosomes
from the ovum and spenn called syngamy. Its DNA , RNA, cytoplasmic
proteins and organelles are distinct from other organisms and, thus,
identifiably human . 13 Philosophically, coming into ex istence is
substantial change. Substantial change is the generation of a new entity
as opposed to accidental change which is the development,
augmentation, or diminishment of that which exists. Substantial
change requires a fonn capable of actuating matter of the appropriate
kind from within. This would be a substantial fonn . This brings about
existence and it determines the type of being that is to result from the
process of change. 14 Understanding substantial change as the moment
that a new being comes into ex istence with its own internal principle of
activity and rest (substantial fonn) call s into question the idea that there
could be a new livi ng being until there is such an internal power or
force. If you delay this question you st ill have to ask, is what is
conceived a human being, an organism with an intellectual sou l? The
conceptus is certainly not able to express such rational activities as
reason and choice. Yet, the human infant is also not capable of these
activities. The degree of development required before God would
infuse a human soul into the growi ng organism has generated much
controversy over the centuries of Chri stian thought. Currently the
question appears as the issue of immediate or delayed homini zation.
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Immediate Hominization

Proponents of immediate hominization argue that human
rational life begins with human biological life. Benedict M. Ashley'~
and William E. M ayl6 hold that this is so because there is a continuous
identity from the nucleus of the zygote to the cortex of the infant. The
nucleus of the zygote is. then, the primordial organ of rational
expression. This central organ is responsible for development and
differentiation. This epigenetic identity allows for no substantial
change after conception and so hominization must have occurred at the
moment when fertilization was complete.
Jerome J. Lejeune 17 and Diane N. Irvingl. hold that the
biologically human tissues of the zygote and embryo must signal the
presence of the human rational soul from the completion of
fertilization. syngamy. Irving argues that to accept that there is only a
vegetative and then a sensitive soul present in the early embryo is to
destroy the unity of the soul. The products of the self-development of
the organism, i.e., enzymes, proteins, tissues and organs, are
scientifically identified as specifically human matter. lfthe soul does
not contain parts and . 1 would add, if there is an integra1 unity of body
and soul, then human matter could not be present without a human
soul. 19
Similarly. Agneta Sutton20 argues that even though the early
embryo does not appear to be differentiated, it is the selfsame organism
that goes on to become differentiated and actually does this itself.
Thus, "A being possessing abilities associated with rationality must
always have possessed a nature inherent in which was an original active
capacity to develop such abilities...a rational nature."21 This is the third
century argument of Tertullian of Carthage, "He is a human being
(homo) who will be one; the whole fruit is actually in the seed.'t22 The
scientific evidence that we are considering, that the DNA of one cell
switches on at the two to four cell stage, asks these proponents of
immediate hominization to reconsider the moment of origin of a new
human life. One has to ask, could there be a new life before there was
an active internal principle of development?
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Monozygotic Twinning and Delayed Hominization
While hirnselfholding for delayed hominization, Nonnan M.
Ford admits that
There are good reasons for believing the same onto logical identity
is retained throughout every stage of growth and development of
the human person from fertilization . In facl, fertilization is the
most biologically significant stage in the whole process of the
transmission of human life. There does not appear to be any other
comparable discontinuity in the process of reproduction to warrant
sen ling on any other stage to mark the beginning of the life of an
individual human being.21

However, Ford asserts that this continuity is not sufficient. There is not
necessarily a continuing ontological identity for all zygotes.
An ontological individual is defined as "a distinct being that is
not an aggregate of smaller things nor merely a part of a greater
whole. ,, 24 All adults are able to trace a continued existence to their
origins. That is, from the end it is clear that there was ontological
identity from the beginning. But, there is not ontological continuity
from conception to birth. Some zygotes divide into two or more
embryos which become identical twins or triplets. With Ford 2s and
Wallace26, Joseph F. Donceel 21 holds that God would not infuse a
rational soul until the organism was an irreversibly existent ontological
individual. The possibility of individual existence being interrupted, as
evidenced by monozygotic twinning, prevents them from accepting that
each hwnan person begins at fertilization. It is clear that the zygote and
early embryo are biologically human and living; what is not clear is
whether they are irreversibly individual, and this in view of the fact that
the embryo might divide into two or more embryos with the same set
of chromosomes (also called the genome). Even though the resulting
embryos have genetic identity, each has its own human soul and
develops as an ontologically di stinct individual.
Ford and Donceel suggest that the zygote develops
epigenetically from nutritive to sensitive life, and finall y to intellectual
life. The nutritive nature is present at syngamy. This nature then gives
way to a sensitive nature, which further controls growth and
development. When the organism has developed to the point where it
can support human life, God creates and infuses the intellectual soul
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with its distinctive powers of intellect and will. This soul subsumes the
nutritive and sensitive powers as now serving the more demanding
needs of human life.
Monozygotic twinning can occur until the primitive streak is
formed at about 14 days after fertilization. Before this time embryonic
chromosomes remain sufficiently undifferentiated to be totipotent and
to produce another individual if splitting of the early cells occurs. In
this way, identical twins provide evidence that biological or genetic
individuality is not identical with ontological individuality.

Differentiation and Delayed Hominization
Proponents of delayed hominization hold that God would not
infuse a rational soul into materials unable to support a human life. The
minimum requirement is differentiation, organization, and at least the
primordium of a central nervous system. For Ford, the early foonation
of the primitive streak immediately after differentiation meets this
requirement. Donceel requires, in addition, the foonation of the
cerebral cortex, which takes place at approximately eight weeks.
There is historical precedence for delayed hominization in the
teachings of Thomas Aquinas, Augustine, and Alphonsus Liguori,
among others, 28 Aquinas held that the organic materials prepared by
the parents must reach a certain level of development through a
succession of souls before God would infuse a human soul. It was
believed that the semen remained with the embryo as a formative power
until the body was sufficiently developed for God to provide the human
soul as the principle of self-development.
The theory of immediate hominization came into vogue after the
early microscopists of the eighteenth century such as Anton von
Leeuwenhoek and James Cooke thought they saw fully formed
miniature humans (homunculi) within the spenn. If such were present,
then there already was an organized body waiting to be enlivened by
God and nourished by the maternal womb. 29 But, it should be noted
that current proponents of immediate hominization base their positions
on Aquinas's requirement for an integral unity between body and soul
and on the understanding of the generation of new life as substantial
change. lO They believe that if Thomas had access to the findings of
modern science he would alter his position and would now support
56

Linacre Quarterly

immediate hominization. 3l
The Philosophical Principles of Thomas Aquinas
Two important Thomistic philosophical principles are identified
by Heaney and are agreed upon by all of the philosophers we have
mentioned. The first is that "the human intellectual soul is produced
immediately by God and not through another agency since, as
immaterial, it cannot come from a change in matter." It is also agreed
that "the human soul is infused, that is, produced directly in a body as
the body's natural perfection.,,)2 Donceel provides another Thomistic
principle upon which all agree, namely, "the soul is substantial fonn of
man." This means that the soul is the form of the body. It is nature as
human, the rational principle of human life. Ironically, it is this very
principle that calls into question Donceel's view that there is a delay in
the infusion of the soul. However, Donceel points to yet another
principle, namely, "a substantial fonn can exist only in matter capable
of receiving it." A plant soul does not belong in a stone nor an animal
soul in a plant. This must not be confounded with the animal soul's
having the powers found in lower natures. "In the case of man's soul
this means: the human soul can exist only in a highly organized
body.")) That is, one capable of human inteliectuaJ functions.
Given the scientific data of his day and the requirement of a
body being highly organized to receive an intellectual soul it was
reasonable for Thomas to hold a doctrine of delayed hominization. The
question before us is whether or not there is now evidence from modem
science that would encourage Thomas either to retain or to change his
position. Thi s soWlds simple enough, but each side sees the principles
of Thomas and modem embryology as supporting its own view.
Proponents of immediate hominization point to the controlling
influence of chromosomal DNA, the continuity and organization of the
conceptus, with its increasing complexity and se lf-determination <tI1d
self-development through morula, blastula, implantation and
differentiation to the formation of the primitive streak and finall y the
child, as evidence for the presence of the rational soul from conception
onward. The controlling Thomistic principle is taken to be that the soul
is the form of the body and that substantial change has already occurred
with the first presence of new life.
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Proponents of delayed hominization point to the totipotentiality
of cells within the morula, the apparent positional control of cells
during blastocyst formation. and the potential for twinning until
differentiation with formation of the primitive streak. The controlling
principle here is the requirement for the body to have reached a state of
development commensurate with the kind of soul that informs it.
Embryonic DNA Activation

As an alternative to the positions that have been presented, and
consistent with the pwposes of this article, we need to now consider the
scientific information presented by Ford that indicates another
perspective. Ford describes that during early cell cleavage. between the
2- to 4-cell stage, the DNA of one of the daughter cells "switches on"
first. Quoting Ford,
It is well known that maternally derived messenger RNA in the
cytoplasm of the ovwn controls development of the zygote at least
up to the two-cell stage, before which lime the embryo's genes have
not yet been expressed or its genome 'switched-on' genetically.l.

Ford also writes,
...the embryonic genome is nol switched on or activated in the
hwnan before the two-cell stage, and probably not before the fourcell stage. even though the embryonic genetic programme is
established at the completion of fertilization ... The hwnan
individual who is ontologically identical with the future adult could
hardly be said to exist before the embryonic genome, including the
paternal genes, is swilched on. (fthe embryo's own genome is not
activated or expressed, or it is suppressed, no hwnan individual or
offspring results.)!

This identification of one cell that is first to be internally
activated, "switched on", is interesting because in vitro studies of early
cleavage have shown that the cell that "switches on" first contributes
more to the inner cell mass of the blastula. Ford writes,
11 was found that cells divide asynchronously and that the progeny
of the first blastomere 10 divide at the two-cell stage became more
advanced and tended to contribute more than its proportionate
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share 10 the formation of the ICM.)6

Studies have also shown that the embryo body comes from the inner
cell mass. After discussing embryological experiments on animals,
Ford asserts,
There is good reason 10 apply Ihese conclusions 10 the human
zygole and the early preimplanled human embryo. This is so
because the fetus is finally derived from some cells that make up
the ICM [inner cell massV 7

The remaining iJUler cell mass cells and the other cells that formed the
blastocyst (trophoblasts) become the membranes and placenta that
support the intrauterine life of the embryo.
If further research supports the current data that maternal RNA
controls cleavage until the chromosomes ofa zygote "switch on", and
that this cell forms the inner cell mass, and that the fetal body comes
from this inner cell mass, then, this "switch on" of DNA would be a
clear indicator of hominization. It would unite the time of substantial
change and the moment when God infuses the human soul. This
switching on is at least 30 to 40 hours after the sperm first reaches the
ovum and may be as long as 50 hours if the chromosome activation
occurs at 4-cells. Chromosomal DNA in the zygote would be the
primitive center of control. The maternal mRNA that informed the first
cell divisions would have a role guiding development of the new
organism parallel to the role Aquinas previously saw for the sperm.
This early mRNA control allows for DNA stabilization before the
reception of a hwnan soul. This diminishes the problem of twiJUling.
R.G. Edwards reports that 32% of identical or monozygotic
twins begin at the two-blastomere stage. At this time, the DNA of the
zygote would not have been activated. However, according to
Edwards, 68% of identical twinning occurs between three to eight days
after fertilization. 38 This is clearly after the critical point of DNA
activation. Heredity is one source of twinning. With heredity it can be
said that the two souls were present from the activation of the DNA.
Sutton holds that "The incidence of monozygotic twinning, the same in
all human populations, is a mere 0.36% of live births [I :270],
indicating that the tendency to twin is genetically determined and
peculiar to a very small percentage of embryos."39 Another source of
twins, cited by Ford, is accidents to the iJUler cell mass, as when the
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blastulocyst is hatching from the zona pellucida just before
implantation. We become aware of very late accidents when twins

share some or most of the same body as in Siamese twins. The
generation of a new human after one of these accidents is small and can
be accounted for if one were to argue that with an accident that ruptures
the inner cell mass, God can choose to let the cells be reabsorbed, or He
can choose to create a new soul. If this accounted for about 30 to 40
percent of the cases, and this is an extremely high figure, we would be
indicating about one occurrence of twinning for every seven or eight
hundred live births (0.35 of I :270 ~ 771). This suggests that the force
of the argument from twinning against early hominization will need
reevaluation if one holds that substantial change and the infusion of the

human souJ occur at the moment the embryonic DNA switches on and
established the internal control of new human life.40
Within this view of hominization at DNA activation, the new
zygote is vegetative and under the power or information control of the
materna1 mRNA until it becomes animated. Initial animation is by the
human intellectual soul. Thus, there is not a successio n of souls in the
way Thomas thought. There is, however, a delayed hominization with
prolonged parental control, even though it falls to the ovum rather than
the sperm. This control ceases when the new human becomes selfdeveloping. This is consistent with the soul being the substantial form
of the body. It enters into union with the matter of the body at the
origin of new life (substantial change) when the new set of
chromosomes is empowered. In thi s scenario the intellectual soul is
initially expressed as nuclear contro l of se lf-development.

Substantial Change
This discussion will conclude with a brieflook at substance and
substantial change. We have previously said that a substance is a tmion
of matter and form. Considered in another way, a natural body can be
said to be composed of substance and accidents. The initial substance
is formed from substantial form and primary matter. Accidents are of
secondary or accidental form and secondary or accidental matter.
Substance is what the new being is, horse, cat, or human. Substantial
form and primary matter are united in substantial change to generate the
new entity. Accidents are the nine categories of being identified by
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Aristotle that vary with the individual and can be attributed to or
predicated of substance. These are quantity, quality, relation, place,
time, position, state, action, or affection. 41
In "Nature and Medical Ethics", Wallace writes, "Thus the SF
(substantial form) not only informs PM (primary matter) and makes of
it a complete substance, but it also makes the substance be what it is,
that is, it organizes and specifies it. Substantial form confers on
protomatter a stable mode of being, so that the natural substance
underlies its accidents in more than a transitory fashion."42 Thus
substantial form, the soul, makes complete, stabilizes, organizes, and
specifies. The existence of accidents is dependent on the prior
existence of substance. They are modifications of substance.
"Matter signed with quantity" was for Thomas thc principle of
individuation, the origination of a new individual. Within this
understanding, substantial change is the reception of a form by primary
matter through the mediation of quantity, which brings a new being into
existence. Following quantity comes all the other accidents. The
mediation of quantity or quantitative dispositions is actually the
Thomistic basis for delayed hominization. As presented above, in this
view, the incipient embryo does not have sufficient complexity or
quantitative development to be the recipient of a rational nature;
moreover, its lack of stability indicates that a stabilizing natural form
is not yet present. 43 The notion of stabilization of the new human being
by the reception of its substantial form brings us back to the original
question, when does a new human life begin? We have considered
three alternatives: stability at fertilization (conception) with no time
elapsed, transition to stability with DNA activation at less than 50
hours, and transition to stability with primal streak formation
(differentiation) at 14 days.
This article has considered reasons given in support of
immediate hominization and reasons to accept delayed hominization,
be that 50 hours or two weeks. Both positions claim Thomas and
modern science as their source. It has argued for hominization at
substantial change, the very first moment that there is a new individual
with an internal principle of activity and rest. The integration of a
philosophical understanding of nature and substantial change with the
scientific results in Norman Ford's book, When Did / Begin? , delays
hominization from conception to the activation of the DNA that
February, 1998
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controls future development of the new human. One might also say it
has advanced hominization from primal streak fonnation with the
awareness that the newly fonned and activated DNA evidences the
presence of the immaterial intellectual soul.
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